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Abstract
A survey is given summarizing the state of the art of describing information pro-
cessing in Quantum Decision Theory, which has been recently advanced as a novel
variant of decision making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert
spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite
prospects, including many incorporated intended actions. The theory characterizes
entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention
interference. The self-consistent procedure of decision making, in the frame of the
quantum decision theory, takes into account both the available objective information
as well as subjective contextual effects. This quantum approach avoids any paradox
typical of classical decision theory. Conditional maximization of entropy, equivalent to
the minimization of an information functional, makes it possible to connect the quan-
tum and classical decision theories, showing that the latter is the limit of the former
under vanishing interference terms.
Keywords: quantum information processing; quantum decision making; entangled deci-
sions; intention interference; decision non-commutativity; minimal information
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1 Basic Ideas and Historical Retrospective
This section serves as an introduction to the problem, describing the historical retrospective,
related studies, and basic ideas of the quantum approach to decision making. First of all,
in order that the reader would not be lost in details, we need to stress the main goal of the
approach.
Principal Goal: The principal goal of the quantum approach to decision making is to
develop a unified theory that, from one side, could formalize the process of taking decisions
by human decision makers in terms of quantum language and, from another side, would
suggest a scheme of thinking quantum systems that could be employed for creating artificial
intelligence.
Generally, decision theory is concerned with identifying what are the optimal decisions
and how to reach them. Traditionally, it is a part of discrete mathematics. Most of deci-
sion theory is normative and prescriptive, and assumes that people are fully-informed and
rational. These assumptions have been questioned early on with the evidence provided by
the Allais paradox [1] and many other behavioral paradoxes [2], showing that humans of-
ten seem to deviate from the prescription of rational decision theory due to cognitive and
emotion biases. The theories of bounded rationality [3], of behavioral economics and of be-
havioral finance have attempted to account for these deviations. As reviewed by Machina [4],
alternative models of preferences over objectively or subjectively uncertain prospects have
attempted to accommodate these systematic departures from the expected utility model,
while retaining as much of its analytical power as possible. In particular, non-additive non-
linear probability models have been developed to account for the deviations from objective to
subjective probabilities observed in human agents [5–10]. However, many paradoxes remain
unexplained or are sometimes rationalized on an ad hoc basis, which does not provide much
predictive power.
Another approach to decision theory can be proposed, being part of the mathematical
theory of Hilbert spaces [11] and employing the mathematical techniques that are used in
quantum theory. (see, e.g., the special issue [12] and references therein). However, no
self-consistent quantum theory of decision making has been developed, which would have
predictive power.
Recently, we introduced a general framework, called the Quantum Decision Theory
(QDT), in which decisions involve composite intended actions which, as we explain below,
provides a unifying explanation of many paradoxes of classical decision theory in a quanti-
tative predictive manner [13]. Such an approach can be thought of as the mathematically
simplest and most natural extension of objective probabilities into nonlinear subjective prob-
abilities. The proposed formalism allows one to explain quantitatively different anomalous
phenomena, e.g., the disjunction and conjunction effects. The disjunction effect is the failure
of humans to obey the sure-thing principle of classical probability theory. The conjunction
effect is a logical fallacy that occurs when people assume that specific conditions are more
probable than a single general one. The QDT unearths a deep relationship between the
conjunction fallacy and the disjunction effect, the former being sufficient for the latter to
exist.
QDT uses the same underlying mathematical structure as the one developed to establish
a rigorous formulation of quantum mechanics [14]. Based on the mathematical theory of
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separable Hilbert spaces on the continuous field of complex numbers, quantum mechanics
showed how to reconcile and combine the continuous wave description with the fact that
waves are organized in discrete energy packets, called quanta, which behave in a manner
similar to particles. Analogously, in the QDT framework, the qualifier quantum emphasizes
the fact that a decision is a discrete selection from a large set of entangled options. The
key idea of QDT is to provide the simplest generalization of the classical probability theory
underlying decision theory, so as to account for the complex dynamics of the many nonlocal
hidden variables that may be involved in the cognitive and decision making processes of the
brain. The mathematical theory of complex separable Hilbert spaces provides the simplest
direct way to avoid dealing with the unknown hidden variables, and at the same time reflect-
ing the complexity of nature [15]. In decision making, unknown states of nature, emotions,
and subconscious processes play the role of hidden variables.
Before presenting the QDT approach, it is useful to briefly summarize previous studies
of decision making and of the associated cognitive processes of the brain which, superfi-
cially, could be considered as related to the QDT approach. This exposition will allow us
to underline the originality and uniqueness of the approach. We do not touch here purely
physiological aspects of the problem, which are studied in medicine and physiological cog-
nitive sciences. Concerning the functional aspects of the brain, we focus our efforts towards
its formal mathematical modeling.
One class of approaches is based on the theory of neural networks and of dynamical
systems (see, e.g., [16–19]). These bottom-up approaches suffer from the obvious difficulties
of modeling the emergence of upper mental faculties from a microscopic constructive neuron-
based description.
Two main classes of theories invoke the qualifier “quantum”. In the first class, one
finds investigations which attempt to represent the brain as a quantum or quantum-like
object [20–22], for which several mechanisms have been suggested [23–29]. The existence of
genuine quantum effects and the operation of any of these mechanisms in the brain remain
however controversial and have been criticized by Tegmark as being unrealistic [30]. Another
approach in this first class appeals to the mind-matter duality, treating mind and matter
as complementary aspects and considering consciousness as a separate fundamental entity
[31–34]. This allows one, without insisting on the quantum nature of the brain processes, if
any, to ascribe quantum properties solely to the consciousness itself, as has been advocated
by Stapp [35, 36]. Actually, the basic idea that mental processes are similar to quantum-
mechanical phenomena goes back to the founder of the old quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr.
One of the first publications on this analogy is his paper [37]. Later on, he returned many
times to the similarity between quantum mechanics and the function of the brain, for instance
in [38–40]. This analogy proposes that mental processes could be modeled by a quantum-
mechanical wave function, whose evolution would be characterized by a dynamical equation,
like the Schro¨dinger equation.
The second class of theories does not necessarily assume quantum properties of the brain
or that consciousness is a separate entity with quantum characteristics. Rather, these ap-
proaches use quantum techniques, as a convenient language to generalize classical probability
theory. An example is provided by the quantum games [41–50]. With the development of
quantum game theory, it has been shown that many quantum games can be reformulated as
classical games by allowing for a more complex game structure [51–54]. But, in the majority
of cases, it is more efficient to play quantum game versions, as less information needs to be
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exchanged. Another example is the Shor algorithm [55], which is purely quantum-mechanical
but is solving the classical factoring problem. This shows that there is no contradiction in
using quantum techniques to describe classical problems. Here “classical” is contrasted with
“quantum”, in the sense consecrated by decades of discussions on the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. In fact, some people go as far as stating that quantum mechanics is nothing
but an effective theory describing very complicated classical systems [56–58]. Interpretations
of this type have been made, e.g., by de Broglie and Bohm. An extensive literature in this
direction can be found in de Broglie [59] and Bohm [60]. In any case, whether we deal really
with a genuinely quantum system or with an extremely complex classical system, the lan-
guage of quantum theory can be a convenient effective tool for describing such systems [15].
In the case of decision making performed by real people, the subconscious activity and the
underlying emotions, which are difficult to quantify, play the role of the hidden variables
appearing in quantum theory.
The QDT belongs to this second class of theories, i.e., we use the construction of com-
plex separable Hilbert spaces as a mathematical language that is convenient for characterizing
the complicated processes in the mind, which are associated with decision making. This ap-
proach encompasses in a natural way several delicate features of decision making, such as its
probabilistic nature, the existence of entangled decisions, the possible non-commutativity of
decisions, and the interference between several different decisions. These terms and associ-
ated concepts are made operationally clear in the sequel.
As a bonus, the QDT provides natural algorithms which could be used in the future
for quantum information processing, the operation of quantum computers, and in creating
artificial intelligence.
The classical approaches to decision making are based on utility theory [61,62]. Decision
making in the presence of uncertainty about the states of nature is formalized in the statistical
decision theory [63–73]. Some problems, occurring in the interpretation of the classical utility
theory and its application to real human decision processes have been discussed in numerous
literature (e.g., [4, 68, 74, 75]).
Quantum approach to decision making, suggested in Reference [13], is principally different
from the classical utility theory. In this approach, the action probability is defined as is
done in quantum mechanics, using the mathematical theory of complex separable Hilbert
spaces. This proposition can be justified by invoking the following analogy. The probabilistic
features of quantum theory can be interpreted as being due to the existence of the so-called
nonlocal hidden variables. The dynamical laws of these nonlocal hidden variables could be
not merely extremely cumbersome, but even not known at all, similarly to the unspecified
states of nature in decision theory. The formalism of quantum theory is then formulated
in such a way as to avoid dealing with unknown hidden variables, but at the same time,
to reflect the complexity of nature [15]. In decision making, the role of hidden variables is
played by unknown states of nature, by emotions, and by subconscious processes, for which
quantitative measures are not readily available.
In the following sections, we develop the detailed description of the suggested program,
explicitly constructing the action probability in quantum-mechanical terms. The probability
of an action is intrinsically subjective, as it must characterize intended actions by human
beings. For brevity, an intended action can be called an intention or just an action. And, in
compliance with the terminology used in the theories of decision-making, a composite set of
intended actions, consisting of several sub-actions, is called a prospect. An important feature
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of the quantum approach is that, in general, it deals not with separate intended actions, but
with composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions. Only then it becomes
possible, within the frame of one general theory, to describe a variety of interesting unusual
phenomena that have been reported to characterize the decision making properties of real
human beings.
The pivotal point of the approach, formalized in QDT, is that mathematically it is based
on the von Neumann theory of quantum measurements [14]. The formal relation of the
von Neumann measurement theory to quantum information processing has been considered
by [76]. QDT generalizes the quantum measurement theory to be applicable not merely to
simple actions, but also to composite prospects, which is of paramount importance for the
appearance of decision interference. The principal difference of QDT from the measurement
theory is the existence of a specific strategic state characterizing each particular decision
maker.
A brief account of the axiomatics of QDT has been published in the recent letter [13].
The principal scheme of functioning of a thinking quantum system, imitating the process
of decision making, has been advanced [77]. The applicability of the suggested quantum
approach for analyzing the phenomena of dynamic inconsistency has been illustrated [78].
The aim of the present survey is to provide a detailed explanation of the theory and to
demonstrate that it can be successfully applied to real-life problems of decision making. We
also show that the method of conditional entropy maximization, which is equivalent to the
minimization of an information functional, yields an explicit relation between the quantum
decision theory and the classical decision theory based on the standard notion of expected
utility.
2 Mathematical Foundation of QuantumDecision The-
ory
In order to formulate in precise mathematical terms the scheme of information processing and
decision making in quantum decision theory, it is necessary to introduce several definitions.
To better understand these definitions, we shall give some very simple examples, although
much more complicated cases can be invented. The entity concerned with the decision
making task can be a single human, a group of humans, a society, a computer, or any other
system that is able or enables to make decisions. Throughout the paper, for the operations
with intended actions, we shall use the notations that are accepted in the literature on
decision theory [62–73] and for the physical states, we shall employ the Dirac notations
widely used in quantum theory [79].
Definition 1. Action ring
The process of taking decisions implies that one is deliberating between several admissible
actions with different outcomes, in order to decide which of the intended actions to choose.
Therefore, the first element arising in decision theory is an intended action A.
An intended action which, for brevity, can be called an intention or an action, is a
particular thought about doing something. Examples of intentions could be as follows: “I
would like to marry” or “I would like to be rich” or “I would like to establish a firm”.
There can be a variety of intentions, which we assume to be enumerated by an index i =
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1, 2, 3, . . . , N , where the total number N of actions can be finite or infinite.
The whole family of all these actions forms the action set
A ≡ {Ai : i = 1, 2, . . . , N} . (1)
The elements of this set are assumed to be endowed with two binary operations, addition and
multiplication, so that, if A and B pertain to A, then AB and A+B also pertain to A. The
addition is associative, such that A+(B+C) = (A+B)+C, and reversible, in the sense that
A +B = C implies A = C − B. The multiplication is distributive, A(B + C) = AB + AC.
The multiplication is not necessarily commutative, so that, generally, AB is not the same as
BA.
Among the elements of the action set (1), there is an identity action 1, for which A1 =
1A = A. The identity action 1 is not to “do nothing”, since inaction is actually an action.
This is well recognized for instance in the field of risk management. Consider for instance the
famous quotes: “The man who achieves makes many mistakes, but he never makes the biggest
mistake of all—doing nothing” (Benjamin Franklin), or “Life is inherently risky. There is
only one big risk you should avoid at all costs, and that is the risk of doing nothing” (Denis
Waitley). This also resonates with the standard recommendations in risk management: “If
you do not actively attack risks, they will attack you” or “Risk prevention is cheaper than
reconstruction.” Thus, “not acting” is not the identity action. We interpret the identity
action 1 as the action of keeping running the present action an individual is involved in.
For instance, if action A is “to marry someone”, the action 1A is to marry someone and
to confirm this action. The action A1 can be interpreted as first “being open to decide an
action” and then to “decide to marry someone”.
And there exists an impossible action 0, for which A0 = 0A = 0. Two actions are called
disjoint, when their joint action is impossible, giving AB = BA = 0. The action set (1),
with the described structure, is termed the action ring.
We recall that, in mathematics, a ring is an algebraic structure consisting of a set together
with two binary operations (usually called addition and multiplication), where each operation
combines two elements to form a third element (closure property). This closure property here
embodies the fact that choosing between alternative actions or combining several actions still
correspond to actions.
In the algebra of the elements of the action ring, the meaning of the operations of addition
and multiplication is the same as is routinely used in the literature [62–73]. The sum A+B
means that either the action A or action B is intended to be realized. And the product
of actions AB implies that both these actions are to be accomplished together. Instead of
writing the sum A1 + A2 + · · · , it is often convenient to use the shorter summation symbol⋃
iAi ≡ A1+A2+ · · · , which is also the standard abbreviation. Similarly, for a long product
A1A2 · · · , it is convenient to use the shorter notation
⋂
iAi ≡ A1A2 · · · . The use of these
standard notations can lead to no confusion.
Definition 2. Action modes
An action is simple, when it cannot be decomposed into the sum of other actions. An
action is composite, when it can be represented as a sum of several other actions. If an
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action is represented as a sum
Ai =
Mi⋃
µ=1
Aiµ , (2)
whose terms are mutually incompatible, then these terms are named the action modes. Here,
Mi denotes the number of modes in action Ai. The modes correspond to different possible
ways of realizing an action. According to the meaning emphasized above, the summation
symbol in Equation (2) implies that one of the actions is intended to be realized.
Action representations, or action modes, are concrete implementations of an intended
action. For instance, the intention “to marry” can have as representations the following
variants: “to marry A” or “to marry B”, and so on. The intention “to be rich” can have
as representations “to be rich by working hard” or “to be rich by becoming a bandit”. The
intention “to establish a firm” can have as representations “to establish a firm producing
cars” or “to establish a firm publishing books” and so on. We number all representations of
an i-intended action by the index µ = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Note that intention representations may
include not only positive intention variants “to do something” but also negative variants
such as “not to do something”. For example, Hamlet’s hesitation “to be or not to be” is the
intended action consisting of two representations, one positive and the other negative.
Definition 3. Elementary prospects
Generally, decision taking is not necessarily associated with a choice of just one ac-
tion among several simple given actions, but it involves a choice between several com-
plex actions. The simplest such complex action is defined as follows. Let the multi-index
n = {ν1, ν2, ..., νN} be a set of indices enumerating several chosen modes, under the condi-
tion that each action is represented only by one of its modes. The elementary prospect is the
conjunction
en ≡
N⋂
i=1
Aiνi , (3)
of the chosen modes, one for each of the actions from the action ring (1). The total set of
all elementary prospects will be denoted as {en}.
Definition 4. Composite prospects
A prospect is composite, when it cannot be represented as an elementary prospect (3).
Generally, a composite prospect is a conjunction
pij =
⋂
n
Ajn (4)
of several composite actions of form (2), where each of the factors Ajn pertains to the action
ring (1). While expression (4) has the similar form as (3), the difference is that the actions
Ajn in (4) are composite while the actions Aiνi in (3) are elementary action modes.
A prospect is a set of several intended actions or several intention representations. In
reality, a decision maker is always motivated by a variety of intentions, which are mutually
interconnected. Even the realization of a single intention always involves taking into account
many other related intended actions.
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Definition 5. Prospect lattice
All possible prospects, among which one needs to make a choice, form a set
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . . , NL} . (5)
The set is assumed to be equipped with the binary relations >,<,=,≥,≤, so that each two
prospects pii and pij in L are related as either pii > pij , or pii = pij , or pii ≥ pij , or pii < pij ,
or pii ≤ pij . For a while, it is sufficient to assume that such an ordering exists. Then, the
ordered set (5) is called a lattice. The explicit ordering procedure associated with decision
making will be given below.
Definition 6. Mode space
To each action mode Aiµ, there corresponds the mode state |Aiµ〉, which is a complex
function A → C, and its Hermitian conjugate 〈Aiµ|. Here we employ the Dirac notation [79].
We assume that a scalar product is defined, such that the mode states, pertaining to the
same action, are orthonormalized:
〈Aiµ|Aiν〉 = δµν . (6)
The mode space is the closed linear envelope
Mi ≡ Span{|Aiµ〉 : µ = 1, 2, . . . ,Mi} , (7)
spanning all mode states. By this definition, the mode space, corresponding to an i-action
Ai, is a Hilbert space of dimensionality Mi. The elements of the mode space will be called
the intention states.
Definition 7. Mind space
To each elementary prospect en, there corresponds the basic state |en〉, which is a complex
function AN → C, and its Hermitian conjugate 〈en|. The structure of a basic state is
|en〉 ≡ |A1ν1A2ν2 . . . ANνN 〉 =
N⊗
i=1
|Aiνi〉 . (8)
The scalar product is assumed to be defined, such that the basic states are orthonormalized:
〈em|en〉 =
N∏
i=1
δµiνi ≡ δmn . (9)
The mind space is the closed linear envelope
M≡ Span{|en〉} =
N⊗
i=1
Mi , (10)
spanning all basic states (8). Hence, the mind space is a Hilbert space of dimensionality
dimM =
N∏
i=1
Mi .
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The vectors of the mind space represent all possible actions and prospects considered by a
decision maker.
The family of the basic states forms the mind basis {|en >} in the mind space. Different
states belonging to the mind basis are assumed to be disjoint, in the sense of being orthogonal.
Since the modulus of each state has no special meaning, these states are also normalized to
one. This is formalized as the orthonormality of the basis.
Definition 8. Prospect states
To each prospect pij , there corresponds a state |pij〉 ∈ M that is a member of the mind
space (10). Hence, the prospect state can be represented as an expansion over the basic
states
|pij〉 =
∑
n
ajn|en〉 . (11)
The expansion coefficients in Equation (11) are assumed to be defined by the decision maker,
so that |ajn|
2 gives the weight of the state |en > into the general prospect.
The prospects are enumerated with the index j = 1, 2, . . .. The total set {|pij >} of all
prospect states |pij >, corresponding to all admissible prospects, forms a subset of the space
of mind. The set {|pij >} ⊂ M can be called the prospect-state set.
The prospect states are not required to be mutually orthogonal and normalized to one,
so that the scalar product
〈pii|pij〉 =
∑
n
a∗inajn
is not necessarily a Kronecker delta. The normalization condition will be formulated for the
prospect probabilities to be defined below.
The fact that different prospect states are not necessarily orthogonal assumes that the
related prospects are not necessarily incompatible. The incompatibility is supposed only for
the elementary prospects (3), whose states form the basis in the mind space (10) and are
orthogonal to each other, according to Equation (9). But an arbitrarily defined composite
prospect, generally, is not required to be orthogonal to all other considered prospects. In
particular, this can be so, but, in general, we do not need this property.
The prospect states are not normalized to one, since, imposing such a condition would
over define these states. The normalization condition will be imposed below on the prospect
probabilities. Generally, imposing two normalization conditions could make them incon-
sistent with each other. So, we need just one normalization condition for the prospect
probabilities, which is necessary for the correct definition of the related probability measure.
Being, generally, not orthonormalized, the prospect states do not form a basis in the
mind space.
Definition 9. Strategic state
Among the states of the mind space, there exists a special fixed state |s〉 ∈ M, playing
the role of a reference state, which is termed the strategic state. The strategic state of mind
is a fixed vector characterizing a particular decision maker, with his/her beliefs, habits,
principals, etc., that is, describing each decision maker as a unique subject. Hence, each
space of mind possesses a unique strategic state. Different decision makers possess different
strategic states.
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Being in the mind space (10), this state can be represented as the decomposition
|s〉 =
∑
n
cn|en〉 . (12)
Being a unique state, characterizing each decision maker like its fingerprints, it can be
normalized to one:
〈s|s〉 = 1 . (13)
From Equations (12) and (13), it follows that∑
n
|cn|
2 = 1.
The existence of the strategic state, uniquely defining each particular decision maker, is the
principal point distinguishing an active thinking quantum system from a passive quantum
system subject to measurements from an external observer. For a passive quantum system,
predictions of the outcome of measurements are performed by summing (averaging) over
all possible statistically equivalent states, which can be referred to as a kind of “annealed”
situation. In contrast, decisions and observations associated with a thinking quantum system
occur in the presence of this unique strategic state, which can be thought of as a kind of
fixed “quenched” state. As a consequence, the outcomes of the applications of the quantum-
mechanical formalism will thus be different for thinking versus passive quantum systems.
Definition 10. Prospect operators
Each prospect state |pij〉, together with its Hermitian conjugate 〈pij|, defines the prospect
operator
Pˆ (pij) ≡ |pij〉〈pij| . (14)
By this definition, the prospect operator is self-adjoint. The family of all prospect operators
forms the involutive bijective algebra that is analogous to the algebra of local observables in
quantum theory. Since the prospect states, in general, are neither mutually orthogonal nor
normalized, the squared operator
Pˆ 2(pij) = 〈pij |pij〉Pˆ (pij)
contains the scalar product
〈pij |pij〉 =
∑
n
|anj|
2 ,
which does not equal to one. This tells us that the prospect operators, generally, are not
idempotent, thus, they are not projection operators. It is only when the prospect is elemen-
tary that the related prospect operator
Pˆ (en) = |en〉〈en|
becomes idempotent and is a projection operator. But, in general, this is not so.
The properties of the prospect operators follow immediately from those of the prospect
states and definition (14). Recall that the prospect operators are analogous to the operators
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of local observables in quantum theory. The latter operators are not required to be idempo-
tent. So, the prospect operators are also not required to be such. The intuition of why the
prospect operators are not idempotent could be justified by understanding that, in general,
a prospect realized twice results in the consequences that are not necessarily the same as a
sole prospect realization. For instance, to marry twice is not the same as to marry once.
Definition 11. Prospect probabilities
In quantum theory, the averages over the system state, for the operators from the algebra
of local observables, define the observable quantities. In the same way, the averages, over
the strategic state, for the prospect operators define the observable quantities, the prospect
probabilities
p(pij) ≡ 〈s|Pˆ (pij)|s〉 . (15)
These are assumed to be normalized to one:
NL∑
j=1
p(pij) = 1 , (16)
where the summation is over all prospects from the prospect lattice (5). By their definition,
the quantities (15) are non-negative, since Equation (15) reduces to the modulus of the
transition amplitude squared
p(pij) = |〈pij |s〉|
2 .
The normalization in Equation (16) is necessary for the set {p(pij)} be the scalar probability
measure. In plane words, the fact that all prospects probabilities are summed to one implies
that one of them is to be certainly realized.
Definition 12. Utility factor
The diagonal form
p0(pij) ≡
∑
n
〈s|Pˆ (en)Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (en)|s〉 (17)
plays the role of the expected utility in classical decision making, justifying its name as the
utility factor. In order to be generally defined and to be independent of the chosen units of
measurement, the utility factor (17) can be normalized as
NL∑
j=1
p0(pij) = 1 . (18)
The fact that the utility factor (17) is really equivalent to the classical expected utility follows
from noticing that
Pˆ (en)|s〉 = cn|en〉 ,
hence Equation (17) acquires the form
p0(pij) =
∑
n
|cn|
2〈en|Pˆ (pij)|en〉 ,
11
where < en|Pˆ (pij)|en > plays the role of a utility function, weighted with the probability
|cn|
2.
Definition 13. Attraction factor
The nondiagonal term
q(pij) ≡
∑
m6=n
〈s|Pˆ (em)Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (en)|s〉 (19)
corresponds to the quantum interference effect. Its appearance is typical of quantum me-
chanics. Such nondiagonal terms do not occur in classical decision theory. This term can be
called the interference factor. Interpreting its meaning in decision making, we can associate
its appearance as resulting from the system deliberation between several alternatives, when
deciding which of the latter is more attractive. Thence, the name “attraction factor”. Using
expansion (12) in Equation (19) yields
q(pij) ≡
∑
m6=n
c∗mcn〈em|Pˆ (pij)|en〉 ,
which shows that the interference occurs between different elementary prospects in the pro-
cess of considering a composite prospect pij . It is worth stressing that the interference factor
is nonzero only when the prospect pij is composite. If it were elementary, say pij = ek then,
since
Pˆ (ek)|en〉 = δnk|en〉 ,
we would have
q(ek) =
∑
m6=n
c∗mcnδmnδnk = 0 ,
and no interference would arise.
Between two prospects, the one which enjoys the larger attraction factor is more attrac-
tive.
Definition 14. Prospect ordering
In defining the prospect lattice (5), we have assumed that the prospects could be ordered.
Now, after introducing the scalar probability measure, we are in a position to give an explicit
prescription for the prospect ordering. We say that the prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2 if and
only if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) . (20)
Two prospects are called indifferent if and only if
p(pi1) = p(pi2) (pi1 = pi2) . (21)
And the prospect pi1 is preferable or indifferent to pi2 if and only if
p(pi1) ≥ p(pi2) (pi1 ≥ pi2) . (22)
These binary relations provide us with an explicit prospect ordering making the prospect set
(5) a lattice.
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Definition 15. Optimal prospect
Since all prospects in the lattice are ordered, it is straightforward to find among them
that one enjoying the largest probability. This defines the optimal prospect pi∗ for which
p(pi∗) ≡ sup
j
p(pij) . (23)
Finding the optimal prospect is the final goal of the decision-making process. Since the
prospect probabilities are non-negative, it is possible to find the minimal prospect in the
lattice (5) with the smallest probability. And the largest probability defines the optimal
prospect pi∗. Therefore the prospect set (5) is a complete lattice.
Remark. Generally speaking, all states of the mind space can depend on time t. We do
not write explicitly the time dependence, when this makes no difference for the considerations
developed below. When this is important, we shall denote the time dependence explicitly.
3 Entangled Prospect States
Prospect states can be of two qualitatively different types.
• A disentangled prospect state is a prospect state which is represented as the tensor
product of the intention states:
|f >= ⊗i|ψi > . (24)
• An entangled prospect state is any prospect state that cannot be reduced to the tensor
product form of the disentangled prospect states (24).
We define the disentangled set as the collection of all admissible disentangled prospect
states of form (24):
D ≡ {|f >= ⊗i|ψi >, |ψi >∈Mi} . (25)
In quantum theory, it is possible to construct various entangled and disentangled states
(see, e.g., [80,81]). In order to explain how entangled states appear in the quantum theory of
decision making, let us illustrate the above definitions by an example of a prospect consisting
of two intended actions with two mode representations each. Let us consider the prospect
of the following two intentions: “to get married” and “to become rich”. And let us assume
that the intention “to get married” consists of two representations, “to marry A”, with the
mode state |A >, and “to marry B”, with the mode state |B >. And let the intention “to
become rich” be formed by two representations, “to become rich by working hard”, with the
mode state |W >, and “to become rich by being a gangster”, with the mode state |G >.
Thus, there are two intention states of the following type:
|ψ1 >= a1|A > +a2|B > , |ψ2 >= b1|W > +b2|G > . (26)
The general prospect state has the form
|pi >= c11|AW > +c12|AG > +c21|BW > +c22|BG > , (27)
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where the coefficients cij belong to the field of complex numbers.
Depending on the values of the coefficients cij , the prospect state (27) can be either
disentangled or entangled. If it is disentangled, it must be of the tensor product type (24),
which for the present case reads
|f >= |ψ1 > ⊗|ψ2 >= a1b1|AW > +a1b2|AG > +a2b1|BW > +a2b2|BG > . (28)
Both states (27) and (28) include four basic states:
• “to marry A and to work hard”, |AW >,
• “to marry A and become a gangster”, |AG >,
• “to marry B and to work hard”, |BW >,
• “to marry B and become a gangster”, |BG >.
However, the structure of states (27) and (28) is different. The prospect state (27) is
more general and can be reduced to state (28) for special values of the coefficients cij , but
the opposite may not be possible. For instance, the prospect state
c12|AG > +c21|BW > , (29)
which is a particular example of state (27) cannot be reduced to any of the states (28),
provided that both coefficients c12 and c21 are non-zero. In quantum mechanics, this state
would be called the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state, one of the most famous examples of an
entangled state [82]. Another example is the prospect state
c11|AW > +c22|BG > , (30)
whose quantum-mechanical analog would be called the Bell state [83]. In the case where
both c11 and c22 are non-zero, the Bell state cannot be reduced to any of the states (28) and
is thus entangled.
In contrast with the above two examples, the prospect states
c11|AW > +c12|AG > , c11|AW > +c21|BW > ,
c12|AG > +c22|BG > , c21|BW > +c22|BG > ,
are disentangled, since all of them can be reduced to the form (28).
Other examples of entangled prospect states are
c11|AW > +c12|AG > +c21|BW > , c11|AW > +c12|AG > +c22|BG > ,
c11|AW > +c21|BW > +c22|BG > , c12|AG > +c21|BW > +c22|BG > ,
where all coefficients are assumed to be non-zero.
Since the coefficients cij = cij(t) are, in general, functions of time, it may happen that a
prospect state at a particular time is entangled, but becomes disentangled at another time
or, vice versa, a disentangled prospect state can be transformed into an entangled state with
changing time [84].
The state of a human being is governed by its physiological characteristics and the avail-
able information [85, 86]. These properties are continuously changing in time. Hence the
strategic state (12), specific of a person at a given time, may also display temporal evolu-
tion, according to different homeostatic processes adjusting the individual to the changing
environment [87].
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4 Procedure of Decision Making
The process of quantum decision making possesses several features that make it rather
different from the classical decision making. These main features are emphasized below.
4.1 Probabilistic Nature of Decision Making
Quantum decision making is described as an intrinsically probabilistic procedure. The first
step consists in evaluating, consciously and/or subconsciously, the probabilities of choosing
different prospects from the point of view of their usefulness and/or appeal to the choosing
agent. The strategic state of mind of an agent at some time t is represented by the state |s >.
Then, the probability of realizing a prospect pij with the prospect state |pij >, under the
given strategic state |s >, characterizing the agent’s state of mind at that time, according to
Definition 11, is the prospect probability p(pij). The prospect probabilities, defined in (15),
possess all the standard probability properties, with the normalization condition (16).
The probabilities are defined in Equation (15) through the prospect states and the strate-
gic state of mind. The latter is normalized to one, according to Equation (13). By their
definition, the probabilities are summed to one, as in Equation (16). But the prospect states
do not need to be normalized to one, as is stressed in Definition 8. This means that dif-
ferent prospects can have, and usually do have, different weights, corresponding to their
different probabilities. In quantum physics, this situation would be similar to defining the
cross-section in a scattering experiment over a system containing elementary particles and
composite clusters (prospects) formed by these particles.
In the traditional theory of decision making, based on the utility function, the optimal
decision corresponds, by definition, to the maximal expected utility which is associated with
the maximal anticipated usefulness and profit resulting from the chosen action. In con-
trast, QDT recognizes that the behavior of an individual is probabilistic, not deterministic.
The prospect probability (15) quantifies the probability that a given individual chooses the
prospect pij , under his/her strategic state of mind |s > at a given time t. This translates
in experiments into a prediction on the frequency of the decisions taken by an ensemble of
subjects under the same conditions. The observed frequencies of different decisions taken
by an ensemble of non-interacting subjects making a decision under the same conditions
serve as the observable measure of the subjective probability. It is, actually, well-known that
subjective probabilities can be calibrated by frequencies or fractions [88, 89].
This specification also implies that the same subject, prepared under the same conditions
with the same entangled strategic state of mind |s > at two different times, may choose
two different prospects among the same set of prospects, with different relative frequencies
determined by the corresponding prospect probabilities (15). Verifying this prediction is
a delicate empirical question, because of the possible impact of the “memory” of the past
decisions on the next one. In order for the prediction to hold, the two repetitions of the
decision process should be independent. Otherwise, the strategic state of mind in the second
experiment keeps a memory of the previous choice, which biases the results. This should not
be confused with the fact that the projection of the strategic state of mind onto the prospect
state pij , when the decision is made to realize this prospect, ensures that the individual will in
general keep his/her decision, whatever it is, when probed a second time sufficiently shortly
after the first decision so that the strategic state of mind, realized just after the projection,
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has not had time yet to evolve appreciably.
In QDT, the concept of an optimal decision is replaced by a probabilistic decision, when
the prospect, which makes p(pij) given by (15) maximal, is the one which corresponds best
to the given strategic state of mind of the decision maker. In that sense, the prospect that
makes p(pij) maximal can be called optimal with respect to the strategic state of mind. Using
the mapping between the subjective probabilities and the frequentist probabilities observed
on ensemble of individuals, the prospect that makes p(pij) maximal, will be chosen by more
individuals that any other prospect, in the limit of large population sampling sizes. However,
other less probable prospects will also be chosen by some smaller subset of the population
with frequencies given by the corresponding quantum mechanical probabilities given above.
4.2 Entangled Decision Making
As is explained above, a prospect state |pij > does not have in general the form of the product
(24), which means that it is entangled. Therefore, the prospect probability p(pij), generally,
cannot be reduced to a product:
p(pij) 6=
∏
i
p(Ai) .
In other words, usually the decision making process is naturally entangled.
Consider the example of the specific prospect state (27) associated with the two intentions
“to get married” and “to become rich”. And suppose that A does not like gangsters, so that
it is impossible to marry A and at the same time being a gangster. This implies that the
prospect AG cannot be realized, hence c12 = 0. Assume that B dreams of becoming rich as
fast as possible, and a gangster spouse is much more luring for B than a dull person working
hard, which implies that c21 = 0. In this situation, the prospect state (27) reduces to the
entangled Bell state c11|AW > +c22|BG >. A decision performed under these conditions,
resulting in an entangled state, is entangled.
4.3 Non-commutativity of Decisions and History Dependence
There exist numerous real-life examples when decision makers fail to follow their plans
and change their mind simply because they experience different outcomes on which their
intended plans were based. This change of plans after experiencing particular outcomes
is the effect known as dynamic inconsistency [90–92]. In our language [78], this can be
considered as a consequence of the non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, resulting
from interference and entanglement between intention representations. After studying the
effect of interference, we shall give in what follows a rigorous mathematical formulation of
the non-commutativity of decisions.
5 Interference of Intended Actions
Interference is the effect that is typical of all those phenomena which are described by wave
equations. Following the Bohr’s idea [37–40] of describing mental processes in terms of
quantum mechanics, one is immediately confronted with the interference effect, since the
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physical states in quantum mechanics are characterized by wave functions. The possible
occurrence of interference in the problems of decision making has been discussed before on
different grounds (see, e.g., [93]). However, no general theory has been suggested, which
would explain why and when such a kind of effect would appear, how to predict it, and how
to give a quantitative analysis of it that can be compared with empirical observations. In
our approach, interference in decision making arises only when one takes a decision involv-
ing composite intentions. The corresponding mathematical treatment of these interferences
within QDT is presented in the following subsections.
5.1 Illustration of Interference in Decision Making
As an illustration, let us consider the following situation of two intended actions, “to get
a friend” and “to become rich”. Let the former intention have two mode representations
“to get a friend A” and “to get a friend B”. And let the second intention also have two
representations, “to become rich by working hard” and “to become rich by being a gangster”.
The corresponding strategic mind state is given by Equation (12), with the evident notation
for the basic states |en > and the coefficients cn represented by the identities
c11 ≡ cAW , c12 ≡ cAG , c21 ≡ cBW , c22 ≡ cBG . (31)
Suppose that one does not wish to choose between these two friends in an exclusive
manner, but one hesitates of being a friend to A as well as B, with the appropriate weights.
This means that one considers the intended actions A and B, while the way of life, either to
work hard or to become a gangster, has not yet been decided.
The corresponding composite prospects
piA = A(W +G) , piB = B(W +G) (32)
are characterized by the prospect states
|piA > = a1|AW > +a2|AG > , |piB > = b1|BW > +b2|BG > . (33)
Let us stress that the weights correspond to the intended actions, among which the choice is
yet to be made. And one should not confuse the intended actions with the actions that have
already been realized. One can perfectly deliberate between keeping this or that friend, in
the same way, as one would think about marrying A or B in another example above. This
means that the choice has not yet been made. And before it is made, there exist deliberations
involving stronger or weaker intentions to both possibilities. Of course, one cannot marry
both (at least in most Christian communities). But before marriage, there can exist the
dilemma between choosing this or that individual.
Calculating the scalar products
< piA|s > = a
∗
1c11 + a
∗
2c12 , < piB|s > = b
∗
1c21 + b
∗
2c22 , (34)
we find the prospect probabilities.
p(piA) = |a
∗
1c11 + a
∗
2c12|
2 , p(piB) = |b
∗
1c21 + b
∗
2c22|
2 . (35)
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Recall that the prospects are characterized by vectors pertaining to the space of mindM,
which are not necessarily normalized to one or orthogonal to each other. The main constraint
is that the total set of prospect states {|pij >} be such that the related probabilities
p(pij) ≡ | < pij |s > |
2
be normalized to one, according to the normalization condition (16).
The probabilities (35) can be rewritten in another form by introducing the partial prob-
abilities
p(AW ) ≡ |a1c11|
2 , p(AG) ≡ |a2c12|
2 ,
p(BW ) ≡ |b1c21|
2 , p(BG) ≡ |b2c22|
2 , (36)
and the interference terms
q(piA) ≡ 2Re (a
∗
1c11a2c
∗
12) , q(piB) ≡ 2Re (b
∗
1c21b2c
∗
22) . (37)
Then the probabilities (35) become
p(piA) = p(AW ) + p(AG) + q(piA) , p(piB) = p(BW ) + p(BG) + q(piB) . (38)
Let us define the uncertainty angles
∆(piA) ≡ arg (a
∗
1c11a2c
∗
12) , ∆(piB) ≡ arg (b
∗
1c21b2c
∗
22) (39)
and the uncertainty factors
ϕ(piA) ≡ cos∆(piA) , ϕ(piB) ≡ cos∆(piB) . (40)
Using these, the interference terms (37) take the form
q(piA) = 2ϕ(piA)
√
p(AW )p(AG) , q(piB) = 2ϕ(piB)
√
p(BW )p(BG) . (41)
The interference terms characterize the existence of deliberations between the decisions of
choosing a friend and, at the same time, a type of work.
This example illustrates the observation that the phenomenon of decision interference
appears when one considers a composite prospect with several intention representations as-
sumed to be realized simultaneously. Treating a composite prospect as a combination of
several sub-prospects, we could consider the global decision as a collection of sub-decisions.
Then the arising interference would occur between these sub-decisions. From the mathe-
matical point of view, it appears more convenient to combine several sub-decisions into one
global decision and to analyze the interference of different intentions. Thus, we can state that
interference in decision making appears only when one decides about a composite prospect.
For the above example of decision making in the case of two intentions, “to get a friend”
and “to be rich”, the appearance of the interference can be understood as follows. In
real life, it is too problematic, and practically impossible, to become a very close friend
to several persons simultaneously, since conflict of interests often arises between the friends.
For instance, doing a friendly action to one friend may upset or even harm another friend.
Any decision making, involving mutual correlations between two persons, necessarily requires
taking into account their, sometimes conflicting, interests. This is, actually, one of the origins
of the interference in decision making. Another powerful origin of intention interference is
the existence of emotions, as will be discussed in the following sections.
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5.2 Conditions for Interference Appearance
The situations for which intention interferences is impossible can be classified into two cases,
which are examined below. From this classification, we conclude that the necessary condi-
tions for the appearance of intention interferences are that the dimensionality of mind should
be not lower than two and that there should be some uncertainty in the considered prospect.
One-dimensional mind
Suppose there are several intended actions {Ai}, enumerated by the index i = 1, 2, . . .,
whose number can be arbitrary. But each intention possesses only a single representation
|Ai >. Hence, the dimension of “mind” as defined in Definition 7, is dimM = 1. Only a
single basic vector exists, which forms the strategic state
|s >= |A1A2 . . . > = ⊗i |Ai > . (42)
In this one-dimensional mind, all prospect states are disentangled, being of the type
|pi >= c |A1A2 . . . > (|c| = 1) . (43)
Therefore, only one probability exists:
p = | < pi|s > |2 = 1 . (44)
Thus, despite the possible large number of arbitrary intentions, they do not interfere,
since each of them has just one representation. There can be no intention interference in
one-dimensional mind.
Absence of uncertainty
Another important condition for the appearance of intention interference is the existence
of uncertainty. To understand this statement, let us consider a given mind with a large
dimensionality dimM > 1, characterized by a strategic state |s >. Let us analyze a certain
prospect with the state
|pi >= c|s > (|c| = 1) , (45)
with an arbitrary strategic state |s >. Then again, the corresponding prospect probability
is the same as in Equation (44), and no interference can arise.
Thus, the necessary conditions for the appearance of interference are the existence of
uncertainty and the dimensionality of mind not lower than 2.
5.3 Interference Alternation
The interference terms, forming the attraction factor (19), enjoy a very important property
that can be called the theorem of interference alternation.
Theorem 1: The process of decision making, associated with the prospect probabilities
(15) and occurring under the normalization conditions (16) and (18), is characterized by the
alternating interference terms, such that the sum of all attraction factors vanishes:∑
j
q(pij) = 0 . (46)
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Proof: The proof follows directly from Definitions 13, 15, and 19, taking into account the
normalization conditions (16) and (18).
In order to illustrate in more detail the meaning of the above theorem, let us consider
a particular case of two intentions, one composing a set {Ai} of M1 representation modes,
and another one forming a set {Xj} of M2 modes. The total family of intended actions is
therefore
{Ai, Xj | i = 1, 2, . . . ,M1; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M2} .
The basis in the mind space is the set {|AiXj >}. The strategic state of mind can be written
as an expansion over this basis,
|s >=
∑
ij
cij|AiXj > , (47)
with the coefficients satisfying the standard normalization∑
ij
|cij|
2 = 1 .
Let us assume that we are mainly interested in the representation set {Ai}, while the
representations from the set {Xj} are treated as secondary. A prospect that is formed of a
fixed intention representation Ai, and which can be realized under the occurrence of any of
the representations Xj, corresponds to the prospect state
|AiX >=
∑
j
αij|AiXj > , (48)
where X =
⋃
j Xj. The probability of realizing the considered prospect is
p(AiX) ≡ | < AiX|s > |
2 , (49)
according to Definition 11.
Following the above formalism of describing the intention interferences, we use the nota-
tion
p(AiXj) ≡ |αijcij |
2 (50)
for the joint probability of Ai and Xj; and we denote the partial interference terms as
qjk(AiX) ≡ 2Re
(
α∗ijcijc
∗
ikαik
)
. (51)
Then, the probability of AiX , given by Equation (48), becomes
p(AiX) =
∑
j
p(AiXj) +
∑
j<k
qjk(AiX) . (52)
The interference terms appear due to the existence of uncertainty. Therefore, we may
define the uncertainty factor
ϕjk(AiX) ≡ cos∆jk(AiX) , (53)
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where the uncertainty angle is
∆jk(AiX) ≡ arg(α
∗
ijcijc
∗
ikαik) .
Then, the interference term (51) takes the form
qjk(AiX) = 2ϕjk(AiX)
√
p(AiXj) p(AiXk) . (54)
The attraction factor (19) here is nothing but the sum of the interference terms:
q(AiX) ≡
∑
j<k
qjk(AiX) . (55)
This allows us to rewrite probability (52) as
p(AiX) =
∑
j
p(AiXj) + q(AiX) . (56)
The joint and conditional probabilities are related in the standard way
p(AiXj) = p(Ai|Xj)p(Xj) . (57)
We assume that the family of intended actions is such that at least one of the represen-
tations from the set {Ai} has to be certainly realized, which means that∑
i
p(AiX) = 1 , (58)
and that at least one of the representations from the set {Xj} also necessarily happens, that
is, ∑
j
p(Xj) = 1 . (59)
Along with these conditions, we keep in mind that at least one of the representations from
the set {Ai} must be realized for each given Xj, which implies that∑
i
p(Ai|Xj) = 1 . (60)
Then we immediately come to the equality∑
i
q(AiX) = 0 ,
which is just a particular case of the general condition (46).
This equality shows that, if at least one of the terms is non-zero, some of the interference
terms are necessarily negative and some are necessarily positive. Therefore, some of the
probabilities are depressed, while others are enhanced. This alternation of the interference
terms will be shown below to be a pivotal feature providing a clear explanation of the
disjunction effect. It is worth emphasizing that the violation of the sure-thing principle,
resulting in the disjunction effect, will be shown not to be due simply to the existence of
interferences as such, but, more precisely, to the interference alternation.
For instance, the depression of some probabilities can be associated with uncertainty
aversion, which makes less probable an action under uncertain conditions. In contrast, the
probability of other intentions, containing less or no uncertainty, will be enhanced by positive
interference terms. This interference alternation is of crucial importance for the correct
description of decision making, without which the known paradoxes cannot be explained.
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5.4 Less is More
The title of this subsection is taken from a poem of the nineteenth century English poet
Robert Browning [94].
In the present context, this expression means that sometimes excessive information is
not merely difficult to get, but can even be harmful, resulting in wrong decisions. It often
happens that decisions, based on smaller amount of information, are better than those based
on larger amount of information. This may happen because, with increasing the amount of
information, the choice between alternatives can become more complicated as a result of
which uncertainty grows. Increasing complexity often increases uncertainty.
To describe the “less is more” phenomenon in mathematical language, let us consider a
prospect pi∗k that is optimal under a fixed information set Xk, with the probability
p (pi∗k) = p0 (pi
∗
k) + q (pi
∗
k) . (61)
Suppose, we increase the amount of information by going to the information set Xk+1, such
that Xk ∈ Xk+1, and obtain the related optimal prospect pi
∗
k+1, with the probability
p
(
pi∗k+1
)
= p0
(
pi∗k+1
)
+ q
(
pi∗k+1
)
. (62)
Assume that the utilities of these two prospects are the same,
p0
(
pi∗k+1
)
= p0 (pi
∗
k) , (63)
while the uncertainty in the decision making process increases, so that the attraction factor
decreases,
q
(
pi∗k+1
)
< q (pi∗k) . (64)
Then, the relation between the prospect probabilities
p (pi∗k)− p
(
pi∗k+1
)
= q (pi∗k)− q
(
pi∗k+1
)
> 0 (65)
tells us that the decision process leading to choosing prospect pi∗k is clearer than for prospect
pi∗k+1, because the larger value of the corresponding probability makes the signal stronger for
the decision maker, resulting in a larger frequency of choices pi∗k. As the information set is
increased, in the presence of many alternatives, the preferred prospect becomes less clearly
defined as the top choice. As a consequence, a lack of efficiency, a growing indeterminacy
and ultimately the freezing of the decision process can ensue.
When dealing with complex nonlinear problems, excessive information can lead to incor-
rect conclusions because of the extreme sensitivity of nonlinear problems to minor details. As
simple examples, when excessive information can be harmful, we may mention the following
typical cases from physics.
Example 1. How to describe the state of air in a room? The unreasonable decision
would be to analyze the motion of all molecules in the room, specifying all their interactions,
positions and velocities. Such a decision would lead to not merely extremely overcomplicated
calculations, but even can result in incorrect conclusions. The reasonable decision is to
characterize the state of the air by defining the room temperature, volume, and atmospheric
pressure.
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Example 2. How to characterize the water flow in a river? A silly decision would be to
consider the motion of all water molecules in the river describing their locations, velocities,
interactions, and so on. Contrary to this, a clever decision is to use the hydrodynamic
equations.
Example 3. How to describe a large social system? Again, the unreasonable decision
would be to collect all possible information on each member of the society. Then, being
overloaded by senseless information, one would be lost in secondary details, being unable to
make any clever conclusion. Instead of this, it is often (though may be not always) sufficient
to consider the society composed of typical (or “representative”) agents.
6 Disjunction Effect
The disjunction effect was first specified by Savage [62] as a violation of the “sure-thing prin-
ciple”, which can be formulated as follows: If the alternative A is preferred to the alternative
B, when an event X1 occurs, and it is also preferred to B, when an event X2 occurs, then
A should be preferred to B, when it is not known which of the events, either X1 or X2, has
occurred.
6.1 Sure-Thing Principle
Let us now show how the sure-thing principle arises in classical probability theory.
Let us consider a field of events {A,B,Xj|j = 1, 2, . . .} equipped with the classical
probability measures [95]. We denote the classical probability of an event A by the capital
letter P (A) in order to distinguish it from the probability p(A) defined in the previous
sections by means of quantum rules. We shall denote, as usual, the conditional probability
of A under the knowledge of X by P (A|X) and the joint probability of A and X , by P (AX).
We assume that at least one of the events Xj from the set {Xj} certainly happens and that
the Xi are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which implies that∑
j
P (Xj) = 1 . (66)
The probability of A, when Xj is not specified, that is, when at least one of Xj happens,
is denoted by P (AX), where X =
⋃
j Xj . The same notations are applied to B. Following
the common wisdom, we understand the statement “A is preferred to B” as meaning that
P (AX) > P (BX). Then the following theorem is valid.
Theorem 2: If for all j = 1, 2, . . ., one has
P (A|Xj) > P (B|Xj) , (67)
then
P (AX) > P (BX) . (68)
Proof: It is straightforward that, under X =
⋃
j Xj , one has
P (AX) =
∑
j
P (AXj) =
∑
j
P (A|Xj)P (Xj) (69)
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and
P (BX) =
∑
j
P (BXj) =
∑
j
P (B|Xj)P (Xj) . (70)
From Equations (69) and (70), under assumption (67), inequality (68) follows immediately.
The above proposition is a theorem of classical probability theory. Savage [62] proposed
to use it as a normative statement on how human beings make consistent decisions under
uncertainty. As such, it is no more a theorem but a testable assumption about human
behavior. In other words, empirical tests showing that humans fail to obey the sure-thing
principle must be interpreted as a failure of humans to abide to all the rules of classical
probability theory.
6.2 Disjunction-Effect Examples
Thus, according to standard classical probability theory which is held by most statisticians
as the only rigorous mathematical description of risks, and therefore as the normative guide-
line describing rational human decision making, the sure-thing principle should be always
verified in empirical tests involving real human beings. However, numerous violations of this
principle have been investigated empirically [62, 96–99]. In order to be more specific, let us
briefly outline some examples of the violation of the sure-thing principle, referred to as the
disjunction effect.
(i) To gamble or not to gamble?
A typical setup for illustrating the disjunction effect is a two-step gamble [96]. Suppose
that a group of people accepted a gamble, in which the player can either win (X1) or lose
(X2). After one gamble, they are invited to gamble a second time, being free to either accept
the second gamble (A) or to refuse it (B). Experiments by Tversky and Shafir [96] showed
that the majority of people accept the second gamble when they know the result of the
first one, in any case, whether they won or lost in the previous gamble. In the language of
conditional probability theory, this translates into the fact that people act as if P (A|X1) is
larger than P (B|X1) and P (A|X2) is larger than P (B|X2) as in Equation (67). At the same
time, it turns out that the majority refuses to gamble the second time when the outcome
of the first gamble is not known. The second empirical fact implies that people act as if
P (BX) overweighs P (AX), in blatant contradiction with inequality (68), which should hold
according to the theorem resulting from (67). Thus, a majority accepted the second gamble
after having won or lost in the first gamble, but only a minority accepted the second gamble
when the outcome of the first gamble was unknown to them. This provides an unambiguous
violation of the Savage sure-thing principle.
(ii) To buy or not to buy?
Another example, studied by Tversky and Shafir [96], had to do with a group of students
who reported their preferences about buying a non-refundable vacation, following a tough
university test. They could pass the exam (X1) or fail (X2). The students had to decide
whether they would go on vacation (A) or abstain (B). It turned out that the majority of
students purchased the vacation when they passed the exam as well as when they had failed,
so that condition (67) was valid. However, only a minority of participants purchased the
vacation when they did not know the results of the examination. Hence, inequality (68) was
violated, demonstrating again the disjunction effect.
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(iii) To sell or not to sell?
The stock market example, analyzed by Shafir and Tversky [100], is a particularly telling
one, involving a deliberation taking into account a future event, and not a past one as in
the two previous cases. Suppose we consider the USA presidential election, when either a
Republican wins (X1) or a Democrat wins (X2). On the eve of the election, market players
can either sell certain stocks from their portfolio (A) or hold them (B). It is known that
a majority of people would be inclined to sell their stocks, if they would know who wins,
regardless of whether the Republican or Democrat candidate wins the upcoming election.
This is because people expect the market to fall after the elections. Hence, condition (67) is
again valid. At the same time, a great many people do not sell their stocks before knowing
who really won the election, thus contradicting the sure-thing principle and the inequality
(68). Thus, investors could have sold their stocks before the election at a higher price but,
obeying the disjunction effect, they were waiting until after the election, thereby selling at a
lower price after stocks have fallen. Many market analysts believe that this is precisely what
happened after the 1988 presidential election, when George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis.
There are plenty of other more or less complicated examples of the disjunction effect
[62,96–98,100–102]. The common necessary conditions for the disjunction effect to arise are
as follows. First, there should be several events, each characterized by several alternatives,
as in the two-step gambles. Second, there should necessarily exist some uncertainty, whether
with respect to the past, as in the examples (i) and (ii), or with respect to the future, as in
the example (iii).
Several ways of interpreting the disjunction effect have been analyzed. Here, we do not
discuss the interpretations based on the existence of some biases, such as the gender bias, or
the bias invoking the notion of decision complexity, which have already been convincingly
ruled out [97,103]. We describe the reason-based explanation which appears to enjoy a wide-
spread following and discuss its limits before turning to the view point offered by QDT.
6.3 Reason-Based Analysis
The dominant approach for explaining the disjunction effect is the reason-based analysis of
decision making [96,97,100,102,104]. This approach explains choice in terms of the balance
between reasoning for and against the various alternatives. The basic intuition is that when
outcomes are known, a decision maker may easily come up with a definitive reason for
choosing an option. However, in the case of uncertainty, when the outcomes are not known,
people may lack a clear reason for choosing an option and consequently they abstain and
make an irrational choice.
From our perspective, the weakness of the reason-based analysis is that the notion of
“reason” is too vague and subjective. Reasons are not only impossible to quantify, but it is
difficult, if possible at all, to give a qualitative definition of what they are. Consider example
(i) “to gamble or not to gamble?” Suppose you have already won at the first step. Then,
you can rationalize that gambling a second time is not very risky: if you now loose, this loss
will be balanced by the first win on which you were not counting anyway, so that you may
actually treat it differently from the rest of your wealth, according to the so-called “mental
accounting” effect; and if you win again, your profit will be doubled. Thus, you have a
“reason” to justify the attractiveness of the second gamble. But, it seems equally justified
to consider the alternative “reason”: if you have won once, winning the second time may
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seem less probable (the so-called gambler’s fallacy), and if you loose, you will keep nothing
of your previous gain. This line of reasoning justifies to keep what you already got and to
forgo the second gamble.
Suppose now you have lost in the first gamble and know it. A first reasoning would
be that the second gamble offers a possibility of getting out of the loss, which provides a
reason for accepting the second gamble. However, you may also think that the win is not
guaranteed, and your situation could actually worsen, if you loose again. Therefore, this
makes it more reasonable not to risk so much and to refrain from the new gamble.
Consider now the situation where you are kept ignorant of whether you have won or lost
in the first gamble. Then, you may think that there is no reason and therefore no motivation
for accepting the second gamble, which is the standard reason-based explanation. But, one
could argue that it would be even more logical if you would think as follows: Okay, I do not
know what has happened in the first gamble. So, why should I care about it? Why don’t I
try again my luck? Certainly, there is a clear reason for gambling that could propagate the
drive to gamble a second time.
This discussion is not pretending to demonstrate anything other than that the reason-
based explanation is purely ad-hoc, with no real explanatory power; it can be considered
in a sense as a reformulation of the disjunction fallacy. It is possible to multiply the num-
ber of examples demonstrating the existence of quite “reasonable” justifications for doing
something as well as a reason for just doing the opposite. It seems to us that the notion of
“reason” is not well defined and one can always invent in this way a justification for anything.
Thus, we propose that the disjunction effect has no direct relation to reasoning. In the fol-
lowing section, we suggest another explanation of this effect based on QDT, specifically the
interference between the two uncertain outcomes resulting from an aversion to uncertainty
(uncertainty-aversion principle), which provides a quantitative testable prediction.
6.4 Quantitative Analysis Within Quantum Decision Theory
The disjunction effect, described above, finds a natural explanation in the frame of the
Quantum Decision Theory, as is shown below.
Application to Disjunction-Effect Examples
The possibility of connecting the violation of the sure-thing principle with the occurrence
of interference has been mentioned in several articles (see, e.g., [93]). But all these attempts
were ad hoc assumptions not based on a self-consistent theory. Our explanation of the
disjunction effect differs from these attempts in several aspects. First, we consider the
disjunction effect as just one of several possible effects in the frame of the general theory.
The explanation is based on the theorem of interference alternation, which has never been
mentioned, but without which no explanation can be complete and self-consistent. We stress
the importance of the uncertainty-aversion principle. Also, we offer a quantitative estimate
for the effect, which is principally new.
Let us discuss the two first examples illustrating the disjunction effect, in which the
prospect consists of two intentions with two representations each. One intention “to decide
about an action” has the representations “to act” (A) and “not to act” (B). The second
intention “to know the results” (or “to have information”) has also two representations. One
(X1) can be termed “to learn about the win” (gamble won, exam passed), the other (X2)
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can be called “to learn about the loss” (gamble lost, exam failed). With the numbers of
these representations M1 = 2 and M2 = 2, the dimension of mind, given in Definition 7, is
dimM =M1M2 = 4.
For the considered cases, the general set of Equations (56) reduces to two equations
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2) + q(AX) ,
p(BX) = p(BX1) + p(BX2) + q(BX) , (71)
in which again X =
⋃
j Xj and the interference terms are the attraction factors
q(AX) = 2ϕ(AX)
√
p(AX1) p(AX2) ,
q(BX) = 2ϕ(BX)
√
p(BX1) p(BX2) . (72)
Of course, Equations (71) and (72) could be postulated, but then it would not be clear where
they come from. In QDT, these equations appear naturally. Here ϕ(AX) and ϕ(BX) are
the uncertainty factors defined in (53). The normalizations (58) and (59) become
p(AX) + p(BX) = 1 , p(X1) + p(X2) = 1 . (73)
The normalization condition (60) gives
p(A|X1) + p(B|X1) = 1 , p(A|X2) + p(B|X2) = 1 . (74)
The uncertainty factors can be rewritten as
ϕ(AX) =
q(AX)
2
√
p(AX1)p(AX2)
, ϕ(BX) =
q(BX)
2
√
p(BX1)p(BX2)
, (75)
with the interference terms being
q(AX) = p(AX)− p(AX1)− p(AX2) , q(BX) = p(BX)− p(BX1)− p(BX2) . (76)
The principal point is the condition of interference alternation (46), which now reads
q(AX) + q(BX) = 0 . (77)
Without this condition (77), the system of equations for the probabilities would be incom-
plete, and the disjunction effect could not be explained.
In the goal of explaining the disjunction effect, it is not sufficient to merely state that
some type of interference is present. It is necessary to determine (quantitatively if possible)
why the probability of acting is suppressed, while that of remaining passive is enhanced. Our
aim is to evaluate the expected size and signs of the interference terms q(AX) (for acting
under uncertainty) and q(BX) (for remaining inactive under uncertainty). Obviously, it is
an illusion to search for a universal value that everybody will use. Different experiments with
different people have indeed demonstrated a significant heterogeneity among people, so that,
in the language of QDT, this means that the values of the interference terms can fluctuate
from individual to individual. A general statement should here refer to the behavior of a
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sufficiently large ensemble of people, allowing us to map the observed frequentist distribution
of decisions to the predicted QDT probabilities.
Attraction Factors as Interference Terms
The interference terms (72) can be rewritten as
q(AX) = 2ϕ(AX)
√
p(A|X1)p(X1)p(A|X2)p(X2) ,
q(BX) = 2ϕ(BX)
√
p(B|X1)p(X1)p(B|X2)p(X2) . (78)
The interference-alternation theorem (Theorem 1), which leads to Equation (77), implies
that
|q(AX)| = |q(BX)| , (79)
and
sign[ϕ(AX)] = −sign[ϕ(BX)] . (80)
Hence, in the case where p(A|Xj) > p(B|Xj), which is characteristic of the examples il-
lustrating the disjunction effect, one must have the uncertainty factors which exhibit the
opposite property, |ϕ(AX)| < |ϕ(BX)|, so as to compensate the former inequality to ensure
the validity of the equality (79) for the absolute values of the interference terms. The next
step is to determine the sign of ϕ(AX) (and thus of ϕ(BX)) from (80) and their typical
amplitudes |ϕ(AX)| and |ϕ(BX)|.
Signs of Uncertainty Factors.
A fundamental well-documented characteristic of human beings is their aversion to un-
certainty, i.e., the preference for known risks over unknown risks [105]. As a consequence, the
propensity/utility (and therefore the probability) to act under larger uncertainty is smaller
than under smaller uncertainty. Mechanically, this implies that it is possible to specify the
sign of the uncertainty factors, yielding
sign[ϕ(AX)] = −sign[ϕ(BX)] < 0 , (81)
since A (respectively B) refers to acting (respectively, to remain inactive).
Amplitudes of Uncertainty Factors.
As a consequence of Equation (81) and also of their mathematical definition (53), the
uncertainty factors vary in the intervals
− 1 ≤ ϕ(AX) ≤ 0 , 0 ≤ ϕ(BX) ≤ 1 . (82)
Without any other information, the simplest prior is to assume a uniform distribution of the
uncertainty factors in each interval, so that their expected values are respectively
ϕ(AX) = −
1
2
, ϕ(BX) =
1
2
. (83)
Choosing in that way the average values of the uncertainty factors is equivalent to using a
representative agent, while the general approach is fully taking into account a pre-existing
heterogeneity. That is, the values (83) should be treated as estimates for the expected
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uncertainty factors, corresponding to these factors averaged with the uniform distribution
over the large number of agents.
Interference-Quarter Law
To complete the calculation of q(AX) and of q(BX) given by Equations (78), we also
assume the non-informative uniform prior for all probabilities appearing below the square-
roots, so that their expected values are all 1/2 since they vary between 0 and 1. Using these
in Equation (78) results in the interference-quarter law
q(AX) = −0.25 , q(BX) = 0.25 , (84)
valid for the four-dimensional mind composed of two intentions with two representations
each.
As a consequence, the probabilities for acting or for remaining inactive under uncertainty,
given by Equations (71), can be evaluated as
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2)− 0.25 ,
p(BX) = p(BX1) + p(BX2) + 0.25 . (85)
The influence of intention interference, in the presence of uncertainty, on the decision making
process at the basis of the disjunction effect can thus be estimated a priori. The sign of the
effect is controlled by the aversion to uncertainty exhibited by people (uncertainty-aversion
principle). The amplitude of the effect can be estimated, as shown above, from simple priors
applied to the mathematical structure of the QDT formulation.
Uncertainty-Aversion Principle
The above calculation implies that the disjunction effect can be interpreted as essentially
an emotional reaction associated with the aversion to uncertainty. An analogy can make
the point: it is widely recognized that uncertainty frightens living beings, whether humans
or animals. It is also well documented that fear paralyzes, as in the cartoon of the “rabbit
syndrome,” when a rabbit stays immobile in front of an approaching boa instead of running
away. There are many circumstantial evidences that uncertainty may frighten people as
a boa frightens rabbits. Being afraid of uncertainty, a majority of human beings may be
hindered to act. In the presence of uncertainty, they do not want to act, so that they refuse
the second gamble, as in example (i), or forgo the purchase of a vacation, as in example
(ii), or refrain from selling stocks, as in example (iii). Our analysis suggests that it is the
aversion to uncertainty that paralyzes people and causes the disjunction effect.
It has been reported that, if people, when confronting uncertainty paralyzing them
against acting, are presented with a detailed explanation of the possible outcomes, they
then may change their mind and decide to act, thus reducing the disjunction effect [96, 97].
Thus, by encouraging people to think by providing them additional explanations, it is possi-
ble to influence their minds. In such a case, reasoning plays the role of a kind of therapeutic
treatment decreasing the aversion to uncertainty. This line of reasoning suggests that it
should be possible to decrease the aversion to uncertainty by other means, perhaps by dis-
tracting them or by taking food, drink or drug injections. This provides the possibility
to test for the dependence of the strength of the disjunction effect with respect to various
parameters which may modulate the aversion response of individuals to uncertainty.
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We should stress that our explanation departs fundamentally from the standard reason-
based rationalization of the disjunction effect summarized above. Rather than using what
we perceive is an hoc explanation, we anchor the disjunction effect on the very fundamental
characteristic of living beings, that of the aversion to uncertainty. This allows us to construct
a robust and parsimonious explanation. But this explanation arises only within QDT, be-
cause the latter allows us to account for the complex emotional, often subconscious, feelings
as well as many unknown states of nature that underlie decision making. Such unknown
states, analogous to hidden variables in quantum mechanics, are taken into account by the
formalism of QDT through the interference alternation effect, capturing mental processes by
means of quantum-theory techniques.
It is appropriate here to remind once more that it was Bohr who advocated throughout all
his life the idea that mental processes do bear close analogies with quantum processes (see,
e.g., [37–40]). Since interference is one of the most striking characteristic features of quantum
processes, the analogy suggests that it should also arise in mental processes as well. The
existence of interference in decision making disturbs the classical additivity of probabilities.
Indeed, we take as an evidence of this the nonadditivity of probabilities in psychology which
has been repeatedly observed [106–108], although it has not been connected with interference.
Numerical Analysis of Disjunction Effect
In the frame of QDT, it is possible, not merely to connect the existence of the disjunction
effect with interference, but to give quantitative predictions. Below, this is illustrated by the
numerical explanation of the examples described above.
(i) To gamble or not to gamble?
Let us turn to the example of gambling. The statistics reported by Tversky and Shafir [96]
are
p(A|X1) = 0.69 , p(A|X2) = 0.59 , p(AX) = 0.36 .
Then Equations (73) and (74) give
p(B|X1) = 0.31 , p(B|X2) = 0.41 , p(BX) = 0.64 .
Recall that the disjunction effect here is the violation of the sure-thing principle, so that,
although p(A|Xj) > p(B|Xj) for j = 1, 2, one observes nevertheless that p(AX) < p(BX).
In the experiment reported by Tversky and Shafir [96], the probabilities for winning or for
losing were identical: p(X1) = p(X2) = 0.5. Then, using relation (57), we obtain
p(AX1) = 0.345 , p(AX2) = 0.295 , p(BX1) = 0.155 , p(BX2) = 0.205 .
For the interference terms, we find
q(AX) = −0.28 , q(BX) = 0.28 . (86)
The uncertainty factors (75) are therefore
ϕ(AX) = −0.439 , ϕ(BX) = 0.785 .
They are of opposite sign, in agreement with condition (80). The probability p(AX) of
gambling under uncertainty is suppressed by the negative interference term q(AX) < 0.
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Reciprocally, the probability p(BX) of not gambling under uncertainty is enhanced by the
positive interference term q(BX) > 0. This results in the disjunction effect, when p(AX) <
p(BX).
It is important to stress that the observed amplitudes in (86) are close to the interference-
quarter law (84). Actually, within the experimental accuracy with a statistical error about
20%, the found interference terms cannot be distinguished from the value 0.25. Thus, even
not knowing the results of the considered experiment, we are able to quantitatively predict
the strength of the disjunction effect.
(ii) To buy or not to buy?
For the second example of the disjunction effect, the data, taken from [96], read
p(A|X1) = 0.54 , p(A|X2) = 0.57 , p(AX) = 0.32 .
Following the same procedure as above, we get
p(B|X1) = 0.46 , p(B|X2) = 0.43 , p(BX) = 0.68 .
Given again that the two alternative outcomes are equiprobable, p(X1) = p(X2) = 0.5, we
find
p(AX1) = 0.270 , p(AX2) = 0.285 , p(BX1) = 0.230 , p(BX2) = 0.215 .
For the interference terms, we obtain
q(AX) = −0.235 , q(BX) = 0.235 . (87)
The uncertainty factors are
ϕ(AX) = −0.424 , ϕ(BX) = 0.528 .
Again, the values obtained in (87) are close to our predicted interference-quarter law (84).
More precisely, these values are actually undistinguished from 0.25 within the statistical
error 20%, typical of the discussed experiments.
Because of the uncertainty aversion, the probability p(AX) of purchasing a vacation is
suppressed by the negative interference term q(AX) < 0. At the same time, the probability
p(BX) of not buying a vacation under uncertainty is enhanced by the positive interference
term q(BX) > 0. This alternation of interferences causes the disjunction effect resulting in
p(AX) < p(BX). It is necessary to stress it again that without this interference alternation
no explanation of the disjunction effect is possible in principle.
In the same way, our approach can be applied to any other situation related to the
disjunction effect associated with the violation of the sure-thing principle. We now turn to
another deviation from rational decision making, known under the name of the conjunction
fallacy.
7 Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy constitutes another example revealing that intuitive estimates of
probability by human beings do not conform to the standard probability calculus. This
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effect was first studied by Tversky and Kahneman [109, 110] and then discussed in many
other works (see, e.g., [101, 111–114]). Despite an extensive debate and numerous attempts
to interpret this effect, there seems to be no consensus on the origin of the conjunction
fallacy [114].
Here, we show that this effect finds a natural explanation in QDT. It is worth emphasizing
that we do not invent a special scheme for this particular effect, but we show that it is a
natural consequence of the general theory we have developed. In order to claim to explain the
conjunction fallacy in terms of an interference effect in a quantum description of probabilities,
it is necessary to derive the quantitative values of the interference terms, amplitudes and
signs, as we have done above for the examples illustrating the disjunction effect. This
has never been done before. Our QDT provides the necessary ingredients, in terms of the
uncertainty-aversion principle, the theorem on interference alternations, and the interference-
quarter law. Only the establishment of these general laws can provide an explanation of the
conjunction fallacy, that can be taken as a positive step towards validating QDT, according
to the general methodology of validating theories [115]. Finally, in our comparison with
available experimental data, we analyze a series of experiments and demonstrate that all
their data substantiate the validity of the general laws of the theory.
7.1 Conjunction Rule
Let us first briefly recall the conjunction rule of standard probability theory. Let us consider
an event A that can occur together with another one among several other events Xj , where
j = 1, 2, . . .. The probability of an event, estimated within classical probability theory, is
again denoted with the capital letter P (A), to distinguish it from the probability p(A) in
our quantum approach. According to standard probability theory [95], one has
P (AX) =
∑
j
P (AXj) . (88)
Since all terms in the sum (88) are positive, the conjunction rule tells us that
P (AX) ≥ P (AXj) (∀ j ). (89)
That is, the probability for the occurrence of the conjunction of two events is never larger
than the probability for the occurrence of a separate event.
7.2 Conjunction Error
Counterintuitively, humans rather systematically violate the conjunction rule (89), com-
monly making statements such that
p(AX) < p(AXj) , (90)
for some j, which is termed the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman [109,110]). The
difference
ε(AXj) ≡ p(AXj)− p(AX) (91)
is called the conjunction error, which is positive under conditions in which the conjunction
fallacy is observed.
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A typical situation is when people judge about a person, who can possess a characteristic
A and also some other characteristics Xj . This, e.g., can be “possessing a trait” or “not
having the trait”, since not having a trait is also a characteristic. The often-cited example
of Tversky and Kahneman [109] is as follows: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more likely? (i) Linda is a bank teller; (ii) Linda is a bank teller and is active in
the feminist movement.” Most people answer (ii) which is an example of the conjunction
fallacy (90).
Numerous other examples of the fallacy are described in the literature [101,110–114]. It
is important to stress that this fallacy has been reliably and repeatedly documented, that
it cannot be explained by the ambiguity of the word “likely” used in the formulation of
the question, and that it appears to involve a failure to coordinate the logical structure
of events in the presence of chance [114]. The conjunction fallacy cannot be explained by
prospect theory [116] and also remains when different bracketing effects [117–121] are taken
into account.
7.3 Conjunction Interference
Within QDT, the conjunction fallacy finds a simple and natural explanation. Let us consider
a typical situation of the fallacy, when one judges a person who may have a characteristic A,
treated as primary, and who may also possess, or not possess, another characteristic, labeled
as secondary. Generally, the person could also be an object, a fact, or anything else, which
could combine several features. Translating this situation to the mathematical language of
QDT, we see that it involves two intentions. One intention, with just one representation, is
“to decide whether the object has the feature A.” The second intention “to decide about
the secondary feature” has two representations, when one decides whether “the object has
the special characteristic” (X1) or “the object does not have this characteristic” (X2).
For these definitions, and following the general scheme, we have
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2) + q(AX) = p(A|X1)p(X1) + p(A|X2)p(X2) + q(AX) . (92)
This is a typical situation where a decision is taken under uncertainty. The uncertainty-
aversion principle requires that the interference term q(AX) should be negative (q(AX) < 0).
Indeed, this reflects that the probability for a human to act under larger uncertainty is smaller
than under smaller uncertainty, in line with definition (75) and condition (81).
Taking the perspective of the representation X1, definition (91) together with Equations
(92) imply that the conjunction error reads
ε(AX1) = |q(AX)| − p(AX2) . (93)
The condition for the conjunction fallacy to occur is that the error (93) be positive, which
requires that the interference term be sufficiently large, such that the conjunction-fallacy
condition
|q(AX)| > p(AX2) (94)
be satisfied.
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The QDT thus predicts that a person will make a decision exhibiting the conjunction
fallacy when (i) uncertainty is present and (ii) the interference term, which is negative by
the uncertainty-aversion principle, has a sufficiently large amplitude, according to condition
(94).
7.4 Comparison with Experiments
For a quantitative analysis, we take the data from Shafir et al. [101], who present one of
the most carefully accomplished and thoroughly discussed set of experiments. Shafir et al.
questioned large groups of students in the following way. The students were provided with
booklets each containing a brief description of a person. It was stated that the described
person could have a primary characteristic (A) and could have additionally a second char-
acteristic (X1), or could be free of this second characteristic (X2).
In total, there were 28 experiments separated into two groups according to the conjunctive
category of the studied characteristics. In 14 cases, the features A and X1 were compatible
with each other, and in the other 14 cases, they were incompatible. The characteristics
were treated as compatible, when they were felt as closely related according to some tradi-
tional wisdom, for instance, “woman teacher” (A) and “feminist” (X1). Another example of
compatible features is “chess player” (A) and “professor” (X1). Those characteristics that
were not related by direct logical connections were considered as incompatible, such as “bird
watcher” (A) and “truck driver” (X1) or “bicycle racer” (A) and “nurse” (X1).
In each of the 28 experiments, the students were asked to evaluate both the typicality
and the probability of A and AX1. Since normal people usually understand “typicality”
just as a synonym of probability, and vice versa, the prediction on typicality were equivalent
to estimates of probabilities. This amounts to considering only how the students estimated
the probability p(AX), with X = X1 +X2, that the considered person possesses the stated
primary feature and the probability p(AX1) that the person has both characteristics A and
X1.
An important quality of the experiments by Shafir et al. [101] lies in the large number
of tests which were performed. Indeed, a given particular experiment is prone to exhibit a
significant amount of variability, randomness or “noise”. Not only the interrogated subjects
exhibited significant idiosyncratic differences, with diverse abilities, logic, and experience,
but, in addition, the questions were quite heterogeneous. Even the separation of charac-
teristics into two categories of compatible and incompatible pairs is to a great extent arbi-
trary. Consequently, no one particular case provides a sufficiently clear-cut conclusion on
the existence or absence of the conjunction effect. It is only by realizing a large number of
interrogations, with a variety of different questions, and by then averaging the results, that
it is possible to make justified conclusions on whether or not the conjunction fallacy exists.
The set of experiments performed by Shafir et al. [101] well satisfies these requirements.
For the set of compatible pairs of characteristics, it turned out that the average prob-
abilities were p(AX) = 0.537 and p(AX1) = 0.567, with statistical errors of 20%. Hence,
within this accuracy, p(AX) and p(AX1) coincide and no conjunction fallacy arises for com-
patible characteristics. From the view point of QDT, this is easily interpreted as due to
the lack of uncertainty: since the features A and X1 are similar to each other, one almost
certainly yielding the other, there is no uncertainty in deciding, hence, no interference, and,
consequently, no conjunction fallacy.
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However, for the case of incompatible pairs of characteristics, the situation was found
to be drastically different. To analyze the related set of experiments, we follow the general
scheme of the previous subsection, using the same notations. We have the prospect with two
intentions, one intention is to evaluate a primary feature (A) of the object, and another in-
tention is to decide whether, at the same time, the object possesses a secondary feature (X1)
or does not possess it (X2). Taking the data for p(Xj) and p(AX1) from Shafir et al. [101],
we calculate q(AX) for each case separately and then average the results. In the calcula-
tions, we take into account that the considered pairs of characteristics are incompatible with
each other. The simplest and most natural mathematical embodiment of the property of
“incompatibility” is to take the probabilities of possessing A, under the condition of either
having or not having X1, as equal, that is, p(A|Xj) = 0.5. For such a case of incompatible
pairs of characteristics, Equation (92) reduces to
p(AX) =
1
2
+ q(AX) . (95)
The results, documenting the existence of the interference terms underlying the conjunc-
tion fallacy, are presented in Table 1, which gives the abbreviated names for the object
characteristics, whose detailed description can be found in Shafir et al. [101].
Table 1: Conjunction fallacy and related interference terms caused by the decision under
uncertainty. The average interference term is in good agreement with the interference-quarter
law. The empirical data are taken from Shafir et al. [101].
characteristics p(AX) p(AX1) q(AX)
A bank teller 0.241 0.401 -0.259
X1 feminist
A bird watcher 0.173 0.274 -0.327
X1 truck driver
A bicycle racer 0.160 0.226 -0.340
X1 nurse
A drum player 0.266 0.367 -0.234
X1 professor
A boxer 0.202 0.269 -0.298
X1 chef
A volleyboller 0.194 0.282 -0.306
X1 engineer
A librarian 0.152 0.377 -0.348
X1 aerobic trainer
A hair dresser 0.188 0.252 -0.312
X1 writer
A floriculturist 0.310 0.471 -0.190
X1 state worker
The average values of the different reported probabilities are
p(AX) = 0.22 , p(X1) = 0.692 , p(X2) = 0.308 ,
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A bus driver 0.172 0.314 -0.328
X1 painter
A knitter 0.315 0.580 -0.185
X1 correspondent
A construction worker 0.131 0.249 -0.369
X1 labor-union president
A flute player 0.180 0.339 -0.320
X1 car mechanic
A student 0.392 0.439 -0.108
X1 fashion-monger
average 0.220 0.346 -0.280
p(AX1) = 0.346 , p(AX2) = 0.154. (96)
One can observe that the interference terms fluctuate around a mean of −0.28, with a
standard deviation of ±0.06, that is
q(AX) = −0.28± 0.06 . (97)
There is a clear evidence of the conjunction fallacy, with the conjunction error (91) being
ε(AX1) = 0.126.
QDT interprets the conjunction effect as due to the uncertainty underlying the decision,
which leads to the appearance of the intention interferences. The interference of intentions
is caused by the hesitation whether, under the given primary feature (A), the object pos-
sesses the secondary feature (X1) or does not have it (X2). The term q(AX) is negative,
reflecting the effect of deciding under uncertainty (according to the uncertainty-aversion
principle). Quantitatively, we observe that the amplitude |q(AX)| is in agreement with the
QDT interference-quarter law.
7.5 Combined Conjunction and Disjunction Effects
The QDT predicts that setups in which the conjunction fallacy occurs should also be ac-
companied by the disjunction effect. To see this, let us extend slightly the previous decision
problem by allowing for two representations of the first intention. Concretely, this means
that the intention, related to the decision about the primary characteristic, has two rep-
resentations: (i) “decide about the object or person having or not the primary considered
feature” (A), and (ii) “decide to abstain from deciding about this feature” (B). This frames
the problem in the context analyzed in the previous section. The conjunction fallacy occurs
when one considers incompatible characteristics [101,110], such that the probabilities of de-
ciding of having a conjunction (AXj) or of not guessing about it (BXj) are close to each
other, so that one can set
p(A|Xj) = p(B|Xj) (∀j) . (98)
The theorem on interference alternation (Theorem 1) implies that the interference term for
being passive under uncertainty is positive and we have
q(BX) = −q(AX) > 0 . (99)
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Now, the probability p(BX) of deciding not to guess under uncertainty is governed by an
equation similar to Equation (92). Combining this equation with (99), we obtain
p(BX) = p(AX) + 2|q(AX)| , (100)
which shows that, despite equality (98), the probability of being passive is larger than the
probability of acting under uncertainty. This is nothing but a particular case of the disjunc-
tion effect.
This example shows that the conjunction fallacy is actually a sufficient condition for
the occurrence of the disjunction effect, both resulting from the existence of interferences
between probabilities under uncertainty. The reverse does not hold: the disjunction effect
does not necessarily yield the conjunction fallacy, because the latter requires not only the
existence of interferences, but also that their amplitude should be sufficiently large according
to the conjunction-fallacy condition (94).
To our knowledge, experiments or situations when the disjunction and conjunction effects
are observed simultaneously have not been investigated. The specific prediction coming from
the QDT, that the disjunction effect should be observable as soon as the conjunction effect
is present, provides a good test of QDT.
8 Non-commutativity of Decisions
It has been mentioned that subsequent decisions, in general, do not commute with each other
and that the non-commutativity is intimately connected with the presence of interferences
between intentions. As is demonstrated in the previous sections, the phenomenon of intention
interference is a key and general phenomenon at the basis of the disjunction effect and
conjunction fallacy. Within QDT, we expect it to be generically present in human decision
making. We are now in a position to present a rigorous proof that the phenomenon of
intention interference is also a crucial ingredient for understanding the non-commutativity
of successive decisions.
8.1 Mathematical Formulation of Non-commutativity
To describe in precise mathematical terms the property of non-commutativity, let us consider
the case of two intentions. We denote one intention as A. And let the other intention
X ≡
⋃
iXi, with i = 1, 2, 3, . . .} be composed of several representations Xi, such that the
intention A can be certainly realized under one of the intentions Xi from the family X , that
is, ∑
i
p(Xi|A) = 1 . (101)
Assume that the joint probabilities are related to the conditional probabilities in the standard
way, such that
p(AXi) ≡ p(A|Xi)p(Xi) , p(XiA) ≡ p(Xi|A)p(AX) . (102)
For two intended actions A and Xi the following statement holds, demonstrating the non-
commutativity of these intended actions.
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Theorem 3: For two intended actions, A and X =
⋃
iXi, satisfying conditions (101)
and (102), the joint probability p(AX) equals p(XA) if and only if there is no interference
terms,
p(AX) = p(XA) ↔ q(AX) = q(XA) ≡ 0 . (103)
And, reciprocally, the intended actions A and X do not commute if and only if the interfer-
ence factors are nonzero,
p(AX) 6= p(XA) , q(AX) 6≡ 0 . (104)
Proof: By the general rules of QDT, we have
p(XA) =
∑
i
p(XiA) + q(XA) .
Employing equations (97) gives
p(XA) =
∑
i
p(Xi|A)p(AX) + q(XA) .
Using normalization (96) yields
p(XA)− p(AX) = q(XA) .
Interchanging here the actions A and X results in
p(XA)− p(AX) = q(AX) .
The latter two equations prove the theorem.
The non-commutativity of subsequent decisions is reminiscent of the non-commutativity
of subsequent measurements in quantum mechanics. However, there is a principal difference
between these phenomena. In decision theory, the prospect states and the strategic state of
mind are the internal states of the same decision maker. In contrast, in quantum mechanics,
the measurement is accomplished by an observer, or an apparatus, which are external to the
measured physical system. The analogy would be closer, if one could imagine a physical
system that attempts to measure some parts of itself. Since standard quantum mechanical
measurements do not proceed like this, the mathematics of the non-commutativity of subse-
quent decisions in decision theory and of subsequent measurements in quantum theory are
quite different.
8.2 Meaning of Simultaneous Intended Actions
As follows from the above theorem, when there are two intentions, say A and B, the joint
probability p(AB) is generally different from p(BA). Two intentions do not commute with
each other, when at least one of them is composite, consisting of several interfering represen-
tations, or modes. The intentions commute, only when there is no mode interference. For
example, when the mind is one-dimensional or if there is no uncertainty.
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Since the order of intended actions is important, when writing p(AB), one has to keep
in mind that the intention B is to be realized earlier than A. Even when talking about
simultaneous intentions, it is implied that the order AB means the possible realization of
B infinitesimally earlier than that of A. To be more precise, let us mark the intention A,
associated with time t, as At. Respectively, Bt is the intention B, associated with time t.
Then the joint probability of these two intentions, taken in the order AtBt, is defined as
p(AtBt) ≡ lim
t′→t+0
p(At′Bt) . (105)
Because of the non-commutativity of two intentions, the corresponding decisions also do
not commute. Two subsequent decisions, even taken immediately one after another, and
under the same circumstances, in general, may lead to different outcomes just as a result of
the order of their realization.
9 Entropy and Information Functional
Quantum decision theory is developed above as a self-consistent mathematical theory. But it
remains to be shown how this general theory could be reduced to classical decision theory as
a particular case. It is thus necessary to explain how QDT is connected to classical decision
theory based on the notion of expected utility. For this purpose, we need to spell out the
relation between the utility factor (17) and the classical expected utility. This can be done
by invoking conditional entropy maximization, which is equivalent to the minimization of an
information functional. The method of conditional entropy maximization is widely used in
statistical physics yielding Gibbs ensembles [122]. The method of information minimization
is in the basis of the approach to constructing representative ensembles [123,124], using which
it is possible to obtain self-consistent description of all, even quite complex, phenomena of
statistical physics.
The utility factors p0(pij) in QDT play the role of classical probabilities. Then the entropy
can be defined through these utility factors in the standard way as for any probabilities:
S = −
∑
j
p0(pij) ln p0(pij) , (106)
where the summation is over all prospects pij pertaining to the given prospect lattice L (see
Definition 5). The normalization condition (18) is valid.
In classical decision theory, one deals with expected utilities defined for the related lot-
teries [61]. For each prospect pij, it is possible [78] to put into correspondence a lottery Lj .
Therefore, the expected utility for a lottery Lj can be denoted as depending on the prospect
pij corresponding to this lottery. So, we can write U(pij) for an expected utility of a prospect
pij related to the lottery Lj . For concreteness, we assume that the expected utility is defined
so that it is non-negative:
U(pij) ≥ 0 (pij ∈ L) , (107)
which is always possible to achieve.
In addition to the normalization condition (18), we have to impose another condition
related to the choice of expected utilities. To this end, we shall use the notion of the
likelihood ratio, known in testing statistical theories [125]. In classical decision theory, that
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lottery is classified as optimal, which provides the maximal expected utility. Treating the
expected utility as a likelihood function, we can introduce the likelihood ratio
Λ(pij) ≡ − ln
U(pij)
supj U(pij)
. (108)
This likelihood ratio is non-negative, having minimum at zero. The expected likelihood is
given by
Λ ≡
∑
j
p0(pij)Λ(pij) . (109)
With entropy (106), under condition (18) and relation (109), the information functional
is given by the expression
I[p0(pi)] =
∑
j
p0(pij) ln p0(pij) + λ
[∑
j
p0(pij)− 1
]
+ µ
[∑
j
p0(pij)Λ(pij)− Λ
]
, (110)
where λ and µ are Lagrange multipliers. This functional is minimized with respect to p0(pij),
when
δI[p0(pi)]
δp0(pij)
= 0 ,
δ2I[p0(pi)]
δp0(pij)2
> 0 . (111)
The corresponding variation derivatives yield
δI[p0(pi)]
δp0(pij)
= ln p0(pij) + 1 + λ+ µΛ(pij) ,
δ2I[p0(pi)]
δp0(pij)2
=
1
p0(pij)
> 0 . (112)
From the first of equations (111), using (108), and denoting
Z ≡ e1+λ
[
sup
j
U(pij)
]µ
, (113)
which, under normalization (18), becomes
Z =
∑
j
[U(pij)]
µ , (114)
we obtain the utility factor
p0(pij) =
1
Z
[U(pij)]
µ . (115)
Note that, as long as µ > 0, [U(pij)]
µ also defines a utility function which results in the same
ordering as the initial function U(pij). Hence, expression (115) gives an explicit relation
between the utility factor in QDT and the expected utility of classical decision theory. From
this relation, we see that QDT reduces to classical decision theory when the interference terms
vanish so that p0(pij) = p(pij). The condition µ = 1 in expression (115) is not necessary since
[U(pij)]
µ and U(pij) are two utility functions that result in the same preference ordering. It
is natural that the specific value of the Lagrange multiplier µ should be irrelevant in the
correspondence between QDT to classical utility theory since µ just quantifies the degree to
which the likelihood can vary around some a priori expected likelihood.
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10 Conclusions
We have presented a quantum theory of decision making. By its nature, it can, of course, be
realized by a quantum object, say, by a quantum computer or another quantum system. This
theory provides a guide for creating thinking quantum systems [77]. It can be used as a scheme
for quantum information processing and for creating artificial intelligence based on quantum
laws. This, however, is not compulsory. And the developed theory can also be applied to
non-quantum objects with an equal success. It just turns out that the language of quantum
theory is a very convenient tool for describing the process of decision making performed
by any decision maker, whether quantum or not. In this language, it is straightforward to
characterize entangled decisions, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention
interference. These features, although being quantum in their description, at the same
time, have natural and transparent interpretations in the simple everyday language and are
applicable to the events of real life. To stress the applicability of the approach to the decision
making of human beings, we have provided a number of simple illustrative examples.
We have demonstrated the applicability of the approach to the cases when the Savage
sure-thing principle is violated, resulting in the disjunction effect. Interference of intentions,
arising in decision making under uncertainty, possesses specific features caused by aversion
to uncertainty. The theorem on interference alternation that we have derived connects the
aversion to uncertainty to the appearance of negative interference terms suppressing the
probability of actions. At the same time, the probability of the decision maker not to act is
enhanced by positive interference terms. This alternating nature of the intention interference
under uncertainty explains the occurrence of the disjunction effect.
The theory has led naturally to a calculational method of the interference terms, based
on considerations using robust assessment of probabilities, which makes it possible to predict
their influence in a quantitative way. The estimates are in good agreement with experimental
data for the disjunction effect.
The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. A
series of experiments are analyzed and shown to be in excellent agreement with the a priori
evaluation of interference effects. The conjunction fallacy is also shown to be a sufficient
condition for the disjunction effect, and novel experiments testing the combined interplay
between the two effects are suggested.
We have emphasized that the intention interference results in the non-commutativity
of subsequent decisions, which follows from the theorem on non-commutativity of intended
actions.
The approach of entropy maximization, or information-functional minimization, is em-
ployed for deriving a relation between the quantum and classical decision theories.
The specific features of the Quantum Decision Theory, distinguishing it from other ap-
proaches known in the literature on decision making and information processing, can be
summarized as follows.
(1) QDT is a general mathematical approach that is applicable to arbitrary situations.
We do not try to adjust the QDT to fit particular cases; the same theory is used throughout
the paper to treat quite different effects.
(2) Each decision maker is characterized by its own strategic state. This strategic state of
mind is, generally, not a trivial wave function, but rather a composite vector, incorporating
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a great number of intended competing actions.
(3) QDT allows us to characterize not a single unusual, quantum-like, property of the
decision making process, but several of these characteristics, including entangled decisions,
non-commutative decisions, and the interference between intentions.
(4) The literature emphasizes that aversion with respect to uncertainty is an important
feeling regulating decision making. This general and ubiquitous feeling is formulated under
the uncertainty-aversion principle, connecting it to the signs of the alternating interference
terms.
(5) The theorem on interference alternation is proved, which shows that the interference
between several intentions, arising under uncertainty, consists of several terms alternating
in sign, some being positive and some being negative. These terms are the source of the
different paradoxes and logical fallacies presented by humans making decisions in uncertain
contexts.
(6) Uncertainty aversion and interference alternation, combined together, are the key
factors that suppress the probability of acting and, at the same time, enhance the probability
of remaining passive, in the case of uncertainty.
(7) The principal point is that it is not simply the interference between intentions as
such, but specifically the interference alternation, together with the uncertainty aversion,
which are responsible for the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle at the origin of
the disjunction effect.
(8) The conjunction fallacy is another effect that is caused by the interference of inten-
tions, together with the uncertainty-aversion principle. Without the latter, the conjunction
effect cannot be explained.
(9) The conjunction fallacy is shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect
to occur, exhibiting a deep link between the two effects.
(10) The general “interference-quarter law” is formulated, which provides a quantitative
prediction for the amplitude of the interference terms, and thus of the quantitative level by
which the sure-thing principle is violated.
(11) Detailed quantitative comparisons with experiments documenting the disjunction
effect and the conjunction fallacy confirm the validity of the derived laws.
(12) Subsequent decisions are shown, in general, to be not commutative with each other,
by proving a theorem on non-commutativity of decisions.
(13) The minimization of an information functional, which is equivalent to the conditional
maximization of entropy, makes it possible to connect the quantum probability with expected
utility.
(14) The relation between the quantum and classical decision theories is established,
showing that the latter is the limit of the former under vanishing interference terms.
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